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NOTES 
1. In a note (p. 86) Stump promises an essay which addresses "issues involving the 
mechanisms of God's providence." 
2. For a contrary view of the Lewis-Anscombe exchange, see Victor Reppert, "The 
Lewis-Anscombe Controversy: A Discussion of the Issues," Christian Scholar s Review 
XIX:I (September 1989), pp. 32-48. 
3. The essays cited are Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" and Wolterstorff's "Can 
Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?"; both are contained in Faith and 
Rationality: Reason alld Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
4. One might, more charitably, interpret Plantinga as holding that in the case of believers 
the noetic effects of sin, while present, are counteracted by divine grace sufficiently to 
permit our innate noetic dispositions to function more or less normally. 
5. Westphal does, it is true, allow for exceptions in the case of "existentially peripheral" 
beliefs such as those of mathematics. But it is hard to see how this can help; Westphal 
clearly rejects the foundationalist strategy of basing our metaphysical and religious beliefs 
on those other, less contaminated, areas of knowledge. 
6. "The man who wishes to believe in God as his God must realize that he has nothing 
in his hand on which to base his faith. He is suspended in mid-air, and cannot demand a 
proof of the Word which addresses him. For the ground and object of faith are identical. 
Security can be found only by abandoning aU security, by being ready, as Luther put it, 
to plunge into the inner darkness" ("Bultmann Replies To His Critics," in Kerygma and 
Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 211). 
7. Westphal writes, "Perhaps the notion of Christian philosophy makes sense after all, 
not in terms of its propositional what but in terms of its prayerful how" (p. 220). A fine 
sentiment, but oddly placed at the end of ten pages spent criticizing his fellow Christian 
philosophers for accepting epistemological propositions which are not in accord with 
Christian doctrine. 
8. Thomas V. Morris, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, by Michael Martin. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1990. Pp. xiii and 533. 
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College. 
Michael Martin's purpose, as his subtitle suggests, is to present a comprehen-
sive philosophical justification for atheism. He realizes that this has been at-
tempted before, but he believes that the case for atheism must be restated in light 
of certain recent developments, including the appearance of some new arguments 
for theism and revised statements of old arguments, as well as new replies to 
arguments against the existence of God. Martin wants to respond to the most 
important of these. His book and all of the literature to which he refers are 
solidly within the analytic tradition of the philosophy of religion. 
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Though he is aware that people have had a variety of ideas of God, Martin 
confines his efforts "to showing the irrationality of belief in the existence of 
the Hebrew-Christian God, a personal being who is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and completely good and who created heaven and earth" (p. 24). His book 
has two major parts: an argument for "negative atheism" (disbelief in the 
existence of God) and an argument for "positive atheism" (belief in the 
non-existence of God). The former argument itself has two parts: an argument 
that language about God is meaningless; and, in case this is not conclusive, 
an attempted rebuttal of all of the arguments for the existence of God. The 
argument for positive atheism includes an argument that the concept of God 
is incoherent, what Martin terms "atheistic teleological arguments," and an 
extensive treatment of the argument from evil and various theistic responses. 
Thus he includes all the major traditional issues in his book. The result, 
though comprehensive, also has a perplexing implication: if Martin is correct 
in his argument that language about God is meaningless, then the rest of his 
book is meaningless as well-not just pointless (for he would already have 
established that negative atheism is correct), but meaningless (for it is replete 
with language about God). So it is difficult to avoid wondering whether 
Martin himself believes that the argument is correct. If he does, then what 
does he think he is doing in the remaining 80% of the book; if he does not, 
why include it? Certainly some atheists think it is correct, but one wonders 
what Martin thinks. This is only the most obvious example of a pervasive 
feature of the book: Martin's reluctance to indicate to the reader any judgment 
about the relative success of various arguments he gives and about which 
ones he personally accepts. Thus;though his book compiles many arguments 
against theism, it gives the reader little indication of what positions other 
than atheism Martin advocates. 
Martin's reluctance to indicate more completely other beliefs which he 
accepts complicates significantly the assessment of his argument. The belief 
that God exists (or that God does not exist) is only one component which is 
found in many different belief-systems, and it is difficult to give a fair as-
sessment of this component apart from some total belief-system of which it 
is a part.' Even the rebuttal of an argument is based on some beliefs; unless 
these beliefs are true, one has not rebutted the argument but only sketched a 
possible rebuttal to it;2 and many of Martin's rebuttals are themselves based 
on controversial beliefs. 3 Since the justifiedness of a person's holding a belief 
depends on other beliefs he holds (as well as on other grounds he might have), 
the evaluation of the relative strengths of theism and atheism should be done 
in relation to particular belief-systems. Thus one way for Martin to improve 
the assessibility of his argument would be to compare one overall view which 
includes atheism with one overall view which includes theism. Of course, a 
book which did this would not be, even in purpose, a comprehensive case 
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against theism, but the reflections in this paragraph suggest that such a case 
cannot be made in a way which permits its fair assessment. 
Martin discusses a genuinely impressive range of materials in the book. He 
analyzes and evaluates an immense array of arguments by many different 
thinkers. He has indeed responded to most of the important developments in 
analytic philosophy of religion in the decade prior to his book as well as to 
important literature from earlier in this century. With very few exceptions 
(e.g., Anselm's version of the ontological arguments), he refrains from dis-
cussing pre-twentieth-century material because he believes that later formu-
lations have refined and strengthened the arguments in earlier formulations. 
I think his judgment about what material to discuss is generalJy good, though 
there are some omissions I find surprising: WilJiam Alston's work on the 
justification of religious belief and on "Christian practice"; the common 
distinction among foundationalists between being justified and showing that 
one is justified; William Hasker's work on "gratuitous evil"; and process 
discussions of the problem of evil.4 (Of course, some disagreement is almost 
inevitable when different people have to decide what material to include.) De-
spite these few disagreements, I believe that his discussion of each topic gener-
ally raises important issues and provides a useful guide to important literature. 
VirtualJy every argument which Martin discusses has been dealt with in 
more detail elsewhere in the literature, in articles or books devoted to just 
that detail. However, his concern is not to outdo everyone else's discussion 
of all the details or even of just certain details, but rather to survey all the 
arguments which support atheism and to present them comprehensively. 
Though I was often unconvinced by his arguments, I often also found myself 
thinking that I could understand why someone would find them convincing, 
either by themselves or as part of an overall position. However, given the great 
number of arguments which he discusses, it seems to me pointless in this review 
to criticize this or that detail of his arguments. Instead I want to calJ attention 
to the folJowing pervasive features of his book: (1) the failure to consider the 
role of religious beliefs as (only) a part of religious faith;5 (2) the failure to 
distinguish (in Plantinga's terms) the question of the justifiedness of religious 
beliefs from the question of their warrant; (3) the apparent assumption that the 
evaluation of theistic beliefs is to be made from a neutral standpoint on the basis 
of agreed-upon evidence (though he never explicitly states that he makes this 
assumption); and (4) the frequent use, as part of his rebuttal of arguments for 
the existence of God, of the claim that the argument, even if successful, would 
prove only that some supernatural being exists, not necessarily the omnipo-
tent, omniscient, all-good Creator of the universe with which his book is 
concerned. I shall comment on the first two and only allude to the others. 
(I) Few people, if any, come to religious faith by first becoming convinced 
that certain theistic beliefs are true and then casting about for some form of 
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religious faith which incorporates those beliefs. (I suspect that few people, 
if any, become atheists in an analogous way.6) Rather, people have a faith-
commitment, perhaps made in childhood, or make one as adults. Such a 
commitment in the Judeo-Christian tradition is to what the person of faith 
believes to be God; this faith-commitment is interpreted, given structure, and 
expressed in terms of certain beliefs, including beliefs about God, which 
provide what may be termed the theory-component of religious faith. The 
faith-commitment centers on commitment to a Person and also includes a 
commitment to behave in certain ways, to participate in certain activities, to 
accept certain other people or books or experiences as authoritative, etc. In 
short, it is a commitment to a whole way of life. The importance of each of 
the various components in this way of life varies from person to person, but 
every person of faith judges the whole commitment, not just its theory-com-
ponent, adequate or inadequate. Of course, finding serious difficulties with 
part or all of its theory-component may be an important reason for finding 
the whole commitment inadequate, but there are often ways to deal with these 
difficulties other than abandoning the whole commitment. I shall note some 
of them below. 
If a person is engaged in a way of life which she regards as adequate and 
if that way of life includes certain beliefs as its theory-component, then she 
will be justified in holding those beliefs unless she has very strong reasons 
against them. Even if alternative beliefs (e.g., a slightly different conception 
of God or of supernatural beings) might structure, interpret, and express an 
otherwise very similar or even identical way of life, the person of faith is not 
unjustified in holding the traditional beliefs. Consider that in science the fact 
that it is possible that there are alternative theories which also explain a given 
body of data is no reason to stop using or to doubt the current theory. A 
scientist would not be unjustified in omitting a search for or consideration of 
alternative theories until their fruitfulness has become evident or until serious 
difficulties have appeared in his own; in the latter case, he would also be 
justified in attempting small modifications in his theory rather than searching 
for or adopting a radically different one. Analogously in religious faith, 
though there may be many other possible theory-components supportive of a 
faith-commitment which is in other ways similar to that made by some person, 
before that person gives serious consideration to any alternative, it must be 
developed in some detail and she must have good reason to think her own 
theory-component is seriously flawed. Similarly, a non-theist who is consid-
ering a way of life informed by some theistic beliefs would not be unjustified 
in committing to one way without considering all possible theistic belief-sys-
tems; he is surely justified in considering only those informing ways of life 
which have some initial appeal to him. After all, he has only so much time 
and energy. 
116 Faith and Philosophy 
My claim that it is the entire faith-commitment and not just the theory-
component whose adequacy is most important for people of faith is not meant 
to imply the thesis that various alleged benefits of having religious faith are 
to be used to decide the issue of whether to believe certain religious doctrines 
when strictly intellectual grounds are insufficient. (Martin discusses precisely 
this thesis in Chapter 9.) This thesis is an implication a person might draw 
from my claim if he believes that there is some neutral standpoint from which 
to assess the evidence and the alleged benefits. But people do not occupy 
such a standpoint. Instead they already are living by some faith-commitment. 
(At least religious people are; I think atheists are too, but I shall not argue 
that point here.) The benefits and liabilities of that commitment are not 
abstract possibilities but concrete realities, compared with which the benefits 
and liabilities of some other faith-commitment are only abstract possibilities. 
The issue confronting a person, therefore, is whether her present commitment, 
including its theory-component, is so unsatisfactory as to make worthwhile 
the risk of undertaking a new commitment. If the overall life she has with 
that commitment is satisfactory and if the intellectual difficulty is merely a 
problem, even if severe, with one or two beliefs, she would hardly be unjus-
tified in attempting to modify one or another of the beliefs rather than taking 
the risk of committing herself to a very different faith. 
People of faith do often adopt this tactic when dealing with a difficulty in 
their beliefs. For example, even some relatively conservative Christians have 
recently argued that Christians should not claim that God's knowledge in-
cludes the future free actions of free agents, for such actions cannot be 
foreknown. But they have not thought of themselves as abandoning their faith 
or even ceasing to be theists when they made this claim. Martin might main-
tain that they are no longer theists, given his definition of theism, but that 
would not make them any less people of faith in God or any less believers 
that God exists. This suggests that the range of beliefs about God which are 
consonant with Christian faith (and, I would suggest, with other faiths as 
well) is broader than Martin's definition allows. Of course, taking account of 
this range would greatly complicate Martin's book, and perhaps he would be 
content to have argued for the non-existence of any being satisfying his 
definition of God. But in that case, many religious believers who call them-
selves theists would agree with his conclusion, thus limiting the value of his 
argument. 
(2) In discussing a person of faith's response to difficulties in his beliefs, 
I used the term justified (and cognates). By it I meant that the person is not 
guilty of any intellectual faults, that he had not failed any intellectual duties. 
But this is not necessarily to say that he has strong warrant for his beliefs, 
where warrant is what is required to raise true belief to knowledge. Under-
lying this distinction is the conviction that different people may be justified 
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in holding contradictory beliefs-i.e., they may do so without either's being 
guilty of an intellectual fault. They may do so because whether a person has 
committed an intellectual fault depends on many factors, including the evi-
dence and other sorts of grounds available to him, the time he has to inves-
tigate the beliefs he holds, and his intellectual abilities.' Therefore, a much 
stronger case, and probably one which employs different grounds, is needed 
to show that a religious believer is unjustified in his religious beliefs than is 
needed to show that a person committed to some atheistic way of life is 
justified in his atheistic beliefs. But to say that each may be justified is not 
necessarily to say that either has strong warrant for his beliefs. 
Since Martin does not mention or use the distinction between justifiedness 
and warrant, it is not clear which of these his arguments are concerned with. 
However, I suspect that it is the latter. That is, I believe that he would claim 
that not believing that God exists and believing that God does not exist are 
both warranted. But this raises the question of what the reasons are which 
warrant this conclusion. Does everyone have those reasons, or are they at least 
available to everyone? Is there some neutral standpoint from which to assess the 
relative strength of the reasons for and against various beliefs about God? Can 
reasons be assessed apart from other beliefs to which they are related by con-
ceptual and evidential links? Of course, negative answers to questions like these 
would make it all the more difficult to construct a comprehensive case for 
atheism (or for theism for that matter). But these questions must be faced. 
I want to guard against a possible misunderstanding of what I have said so 
far. My stress that beliefs about God are only part of the theory-component 
of religious faith is not meant to imply that only believers can assess those 
beliefs. (I do not wish to imply some sort of Wittgensteinian fideism.) But it 
is meant to imply that the assessment of such beliefs by outsiders will be 
difficult. (I think this is true of the assessment of all types of theories, not 
just of religious beliefs.) Attention must be paid to the other beliefs held by 
persons of faith and to the sorts of grounds which they have or allege for 
their beliefs. For instance, people who believe that the world could exist only 
if it was created by God might have different ideas about what sorts of world 
are possible than do people who believe that the world does not depend on 
a Creator. Other examples can be derived from Martin's discussion of 
Hartshorne's ontological argument (pp. 88-91). Martin contends that (i) there is 
nothing about the concept of an island that would require that an island be 
contingent and (ii) an omnipotent, omniscient Creator might have created sen-
tient beings only to have something to torture. Obviously Hartshorne would 
disagree with Martin on what is included in the concept of an island; less 
obviously, Hartshorne would find Martin's idea of a sadistic Creator incoherent 
in light of what (Hartshorne holds) is involved in perfect knOWledge. None of these 
examples are intended to show that Martin's particular claims are wrong; they 
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are intended only to remind us what is involved in assessing someone else's 
argument. The complexities involved in doing justice to another's argument 
make it very difficult to deal comprehensively with many different arguments 
by very different philosophers in a book of manageable length. 
In closing I want to point out the implications of my comments for the 
overall assessment of Martin's book. It is far more difficult to construct an 
overall case for atheism (or for theism) than Martin acknowledges. People's 
different understandings of what God is like and differences among the other 
beliefs which people hold make it difficult to show that the theistic beliefs 
in the theory-components of faith are never justified. The difficulty is in-
creased by the fact that people hold the theory-component as part of a faith-
commitment which is itself justified by its overall contribution to the person's 
life. Therefore, there seems little value in attempting a comprehensive case 
for atheism (or for theism), as opposed to a detailed exploration of one 
argument or to critiques of a well-defined overall position. Consequently, I 
believe that the primary value of Martin's book lies in his discussion of each 
topic. These discussions contain helpful summaries of issues, often raise 
interesting and worthwhile points, and include valuable bibliographical ma-
terial in the notes. But it is unlikely that any book which is as general as his 
tries-to be will, or even should, convince any person with a theistic faith that 
the intellectual problems are so great and so insoluble that she should give 
up her theistic beliefs. The book as a whole does present a good case that 
atheism is not necessarily unjustified-i.e., that an atheist is not necessarily 
gUilty of any egregious intellectual faults. But I think that most theists would 
already agree on that point. However, the book hardly shows that the case 
for either positive or negative atheism is so strong that every intellectually 
honest person should hold either belief. 
Incidentally, the reader should also be warned that there are several poten-
tially misleading errors in the book-i.e., not just misspellings (of which I 
noted only one), but points in the argument where a crucial word like not has 
been omitted or wrongly inserted, or where a reference to a numbered point 
(or a subscript) is wrongly numbered. I counted nineteen such occurrences-
at least if I followed Martin's argument at these points. 
NOTES 
1. His failure to consider a belief about God as part of a total belief-system has some 
odd results. For instance, he defines omniscience to include all knowledge by acquaintance 
and all know-how, as well as all knowledge of true propositions and no false beliefs (p. 
288). Then he argues that there are incoherences in this concept of omniscience. However, 
virtually no person of faith would use this definition. Martin considers any other definition 
inadequate, but surely the one who believes a theory has the right to specify what theory 
he believes. 
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2. Interestingly, he is aware of this when he is criticizing Plantinga's use of Satan as an 
explanation of natural evil. He admits that this suggestion defeats the deductive problem 
of evil, but he insists that its success as an answer to the probabilistic argument from evil 
depends on how probable the theory of Satan is. 
3. One particularly clear example of this is Martin's use of Bonjour's criticism of 
foundationalism as part of his rebuttal of the foundationalism underlying Plantinga's claim 
that beliefs about God may be properly basic. Unless Martin is willing to specify and 
defend a non-foundationalist epistemology as part of an overall belief-system which 
includes atheism, it is difficult to assess how successful his rebuttal of foundationalism is. 
Many of the other beliefs which Martin uses in his criticism of the arguments of theists 
are beliefs on which theists and atheists might well disagree, making all the more 
difficult the assessment of their strength as reasons for doubting or rejecting some theistic 
arguments. 
4. The omission of Hasker's work is all the more surprising because Martin includes 
an extended discussion of Rowe's argument from evil, and many of Hasker's papers are 
in dialogue with Rowe. Perhaps the omission of process discussions of the problem of 
evil may be explained on the grounds that process theism understands God in a way 
different from Martin's definition, but he does depart from that definition himself in a brief 
discussion of a "finite God" theodicy and in a discussion of views of God's knowledge 
which deny that God knows the future actions of free agents. 
5. He seems to consider faith a fom1 of intellectual assent, either justified by the 
evidence (Aquinas) or going radically beyond or even against the evidence (Kierkegaard). 
He uses the phrase "belief in God" to refer to having faith in God and to believing that 
God exists, as though there were little or no difference between the two. 
6. In his "Preface" Martin tells of the influence which childhood conversations with his 
atheistic step-grandfather had on his becoming an atheist. 
7. Martin acknowledges this in one footnote (n. 8 on p. 484), but he does not draw from 
it the implications which I do in my review. 
Divine, Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin 
Farrer, edited by Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson. Edinburgh: 
T & T Clark, 1990. Pp. 281. Cloth. 
CHARLES TALIAFERRO, st. Olaf College. 
It is fitting that Austin Farrer's work should inspire philosophical theology. 
Austin Farrer (1904-1968), an Anglican priest and Oxford academic, was a 
philosophical theologian of a high order. The present volume is not a com-
mentary on Farrer's work, but a collection of papers which variously employ 
Farrer's understanding of Divine agency as a point of departure in developing 
independent positions in thy philosophy of God. Contributors discuss cre-
ation, the miraculous, double agency (God's action through human action), 
the place of narrative in understanding Divine activity, epistemic conditions 
for recognizing God's action, and the implications of our beliefs about God's 
